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Abstract
The Calciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005–6 season serves as an
opportunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behavior, following league-
imposed punishments on clubs whose ofﬁcials were found guilty of corrupt practices.
Using a difference-in-differences estimation method, we ﬁnd that home attendances for
convicted teams fell by around 16%, relative to those clubs not subject to punishment. We
show further that the fall in attendances resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reductions.
Our results suggest that a sizeable number of fans of the punished clubs were subsequently
deterred from supporting their teams inside the stadium.
I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to identify, using a difference-in-difference methodology, a
possible consumer response to a speciﬁc episode of corruption.The literature on corruption
has hitherto focussed on the supply-side, examining incentives and consequences of corrupt
behaviour. This literature has not surprisingly covered the behaviour of Governments and
other public sector organizations such as the police, the judiciary and publicly owned
companies.The various chapters in edited volumes such as Jain (1998) andRose-Ackerman
(2007) and survey articles such asAidt (2003) tend to deal with issues of corrupt practices
performed by civil servants, public representatives and private company executives. This
emphasis on public sector corruption matches the deﬁnition of corruption provided by
Jain (2001), as an action in which the power of public ofﬁce is used for personal gain in
a manner that contravenes the rules of the game. Examples of corrupt practices are bribes
to politicians to inﬂuence the award of tenders in public procurement.
JEL Classiﬁcation numbers: L83, K42
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Absent so far from the literature on economics of corruption is any study demonstrating
the impacts on consumers of revealed episodes of corruption. This important research
question is not covered at all in the edited volumes of Jain (1998) and Rose-Ackerman
(2007). It can be argued that products or services whose delivery has been revealed to be
subject to corrupt practices may be seen as tainted in the views of some consumers.
The principal reason for the absence of studies on consumer (or voter) response to
corrupt practices is surely a lack of data. The sports industry offers a setting where corrupt
episodes are accurately recorded, where punishments are administered by sports governing
bodies and where audience demand, in the form of gate attendance at sporting ﬁxtures, is
observable and systematically recorded. The particular setting for our analysis is the top
division of Italian football, Serie A.
Our paper will identify, using the now-standard difference-in-difference estimator, an
adverse impact on consumer (fan) demand from a clear example of corrupt practices in pro-
fessional team sports: Italy’sCalciopoli scandal of 2006. In this scandal, ofﬁcials employed
by ﬁve Italian clubs were found guilty of attempting to inﬂuence referee behaviour so as
to enhance the winning potential of their teams in particular League ﬁxtures. Prominent in
these illegal dealings was one of Italy’s top clubs, Juventus, which has a tradition of large
support and high levels of success. The ﬁve guilty clubs were punished and some ofﬁcials
were given jail sentences while others were banned from further involvement in football.
The key point of our identiﬁcation strategy is the possibility to compare attendances of
punished clubs (our treatment group) and unpunished clubs (our control group) in the years
before and after Calciopoli.
It isworth stressing that Italian football is a severe test bed for identiﬁcationof signiﬁcant
consumer impacts from scandal. This is because the history of Italian football is littered
with episodes of match-ﬁxing and corruption, not all of which can be stereotypically traced
to links with Italian organized crime. Foot (2007) documents the long trail of corruption in
Italian football. Given that corruption is actually a part of Italian football culture one might
expect Italian football fans to be reconciled to the existence of corruption even if they dislike
it. In such a context, one might expect to ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of theCalciopoli episode
on Italian club attendances. On the other hand, this episode was so widely publicized and
condemned that an adverse effect on attendances would appear to be plausible. We shall
offer substantial empirical evidence in support of economically and statistically signiﬁcant
adverse effects of Calciopoli on club attendances. We also offer some partial evidence to
suggest that fans’ response to Calciopoli was driven by disillusionment rather than moral
disapproval.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section II explains how the Calciopoli episode de-
veloped and demonstrates the punishments given to the guilty clubs. This section also
highlights the product market context for the Calciopoli scandal. Section III explains our
difference-in-differences estimation method. Section IV details our data set and our model
of consumer demand. Section V offers our empirical results and section VI concludes.
II. The Calciopoli scandal
Italian professional football is organized in two divisions, Serie A which has 20 teams and
Serie B which has 22 teams.At the end of each season, the three bottom teams are demoted
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from Serie A and replaced by three promoted teams from Serie B. The title winners from
Serie A plus the next two teams qualify for the UEFA Champions’ League. The next three
teams qualify for less prestigious UEFA Europa League (formerly the UEFA Cup). In any
league match, three points are awarded for a win and one for a draw.
Allegations of corrupt practices in Italian football predate theCalciopoli scandal which
involves the 2004–05 season, when Juventus was the League winner with 86 points, seven
ahead of nearest rival, AC Milan. Garlando (2005) suggests that 20 matches involving
Juventus could be linked to suspicious referee decisions or even outright match-ﬁxing over
the period 1994–2004.
TheCalciopoli scandal was ﬁrst alerted to the Italian football authorities when prosecu-
tors investigated allegations of player doping at Juventus. A full account of the Calciopoli
scandal can be found in Boeri and Severgnini (2011), who also emphasize the subtle nature
of the corruption that was practised.1 Referees were encouraged to make unwarranted de-
cisions, not necessarily directly favouring a prosecuted team in a current game but which
would impact on the implicated teams in future games.
The process of inﬂuence exerted by certain club ofﬁcials took three forms. First, some
referees known to be favourable to Juventus were allocated to important games of Champi-
onship signiﬁcance. Second, some referees were encouraged to give beneﬁcial decisions to
Juventus in important games. Third, and more subtly, players in matches not involving Ju-
ventus received unjustiﬁed cautions and dismissals that led to suspensions and hence their
unavailability for a forthcoming match against Juventus. Distaso et al. (2012) offer empir-
ical evidence at match level suggesting a lack of referee bias towards Calciopoli-punished
teams playing in the 2004–05 season covered by the inquiry. This is still consistent with
the revelations of corruption.
Although the investigation initially focused on Juventus, several other teams’ ofﬁcials
were found to be undertaking similar corrupt practices. The implicated clubs wereArezzo,
Fiorentina, Juventus, Lazio, AC Milan and Reggina. In July 2006, the Italian Football
Federation’s prosecutor recommended that Juventus be stripped of its 2004–05 and 2005–
06 League titles and be demoted two divisions to the regional division C1, Italy’s third tier
made up of small semi-professional teams. Arezzo was in Serie B (second tier) at the time
but the other ﬁve implicated clubs were in Serie A. The original recommended and ﬁnal
punishments, awarded after appeal, are set out in Table 1. Appeal cases centred around the
attempts to manipulate match results in the case of Juventus as opposed to allegedly more
minor offences by the other clubs. Points deductions were applied at the beginning of the
2006–07 season.
In addition to the club-level punishments set out in Table 1, several club ofﬁcials were
banned from taking positions at any level in Italian football for speciﬁed periods. Table 1
reveals that the actual punishments imposed on the ﬁve guilty Serie A clubs were much
less severe than those initially proposed. In particular, only Juventus was demoted and
the actual points penalties were sharply reduced upon appeal. The exclusions from UEFA
competitions (Champions’League and UEFA Europa Cup) were agreed after consultation
between the Italian Football Federation and UEFA. Faced with a nine point deduction,
1
In a sequel paper, Boeri and Severgnini (2013) discuss the more common form of match-ﬁxing expressed through
betting markets, speciﬁcally the Scomessopoli scandal that followed the Calciopoli episode.
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TABLE 1
Calciopoli punishments
Team Original punishment Final punishment
AC Milan Relegated to Serie B No relegation
Deduction of 15 points 2006/07 Deduction of 8 points 2006/07
Ex post deduction of 30 points 2005/06
One home game to be played behind closed doors
Fiorentina Relegated to Serie B No relegation
Deduction of 12 points 2006/07 Deducted 15 points 2006/07
Excluded from UEFA Champions’ League 2006/07
Two home games to be played behind closed doors
Juventus Removal of 2004/05 and 2005/06 Removal of 2004/05 and 2005/06 Serie A titles
Serie A titles
Relegated to Serie C1 Relegated to Serie B
Deduction of 30 points Deducted 9 points 2006/07
Exclude from UEFA Champions’ League 2006/07
Three games to be played behind closed doors
Lazio Relegated to Serie B No relegation
Deduction of 7 points Deducted 3 points 2006/07
Excluded from UEFA Cup 2006/07 Two games to be played behind closed doors
Reggina No relegation No relegation
Deduction of 15 points Deducted 11 points 2006/07
£ 68,000 ﬁne
rather than 30 as recommended initially by the League’s prosecutor, Juventus won the
Serie B Championship in the 2006–07 therefore giving them promotion back to Serie A at
the ﬁrst opportunity. Juventus lost several star players who joined other European teams.
Fiorentina suffered a 15 point deduction but overcame this penalty to ﬁnish sixth in Serie
A in 2006–07 leading to qualiﬁcation for the 2007/08 UEFA Europa Cup.
The economic andﬁnancial context forCalciopoliwas one of declining gate attendances
and revenues, only partially offset by rising income from sales of television broadcast
rights. As reported by Baroncelli and Lago (2006), Baroncelli and Caruso (2011) and
Boeri and Severgnini (2014), Italian SerieA clubs after 2000 faced a difﬁcult combination
of rising payrolls, needed to attract and retain star players in a competitive Europeanmarket
for player talent, and sluggish growth of revenues compared to other European Leagues
such as England, Germany and Spain. Gate revenues actually declined reﬂecting reduced
attendances in turn affected by hooliganism in and around stadia, restrictions on away fans
to attend matches, introduction of identity cards to deter hooliganism, poor quality stadia
and poor quality of play as several top stars migrated away from Italy to other European
Leagues (Di Domizio, 2007; Boeri and Severgnini, 2014).This led to deteriorating balance
sheets for many clubs.
Boeri and Severgnini (2014) observe that nine of 37 Serie A clubs had at least one
episode of bankruptcy between 2001–02 and 2010–11. Baroncelli and Caruso (2011) note
that for the 2006–07 season, Serie A player payrolls were 62% of total turnover, up from
58% in 1997 and greater than equivalent ratios for other European leagues. This ﬁnan-
cial pressure may have induced clubs such as Juventus to engage in corrupt practices so
as to illegally sustain their positions at the top of the Italian League, win domestic titles
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and qualify for the lucrative UEFA Champions’ League. However, Juventus was one of
only two Serie A clubs to post a pre-tax operating proﬁt in the 2002–03 ﬁnancial year, al-
though as a quoted company on the Italian stock exchange it suffered a reduction in market
capitalization from C430m in 2001 to C183m in 2004 (Baroncelli and Lago, 2006).
III. Econometric model
Our purpose is to identify the causal effect of corruption (Calciopoli) on attendance.
Analysis of corruption in sports such as Forrest and Simmons (2003) and Forrest, McHale
and McAuley (2008) uses an economics of crime model. We exploit instead the fact that
some teams have been found guilty, and punished, as a natural experiment. This is possible
because we have panel data available before and after Calciopoli, and not all the teams
received the punishment.
Knowing that the corruption took place during the season (s) 2005–06 but punishment
was handed out for the season 2006–07, we deﬁne the binary variable
Cis =0 if team i played in s <2006−07
Cis =1 if team i played in s>2006−07.
This is our variable of interest, which excludes the season 2006–07 because we want
to estimate the effect of corruption on attendance from a pretreatment period (2002–
03 to 2005–06) to a posttreatment period (2007–08 to 2010–11).2 We observe a drop
in attendance in the season 2006–07, and we assume this is mainly due to the lower
competitiveness of the punished teams and the absence of Juventus from Serie A. This
may have caused a loss of interest in some supporters, at least those deﬁned lukewarm
(‘tiepidi’) and hot (‘caldi’) by an Italian survey,3 which showed that Juventus accounted
for more than 50% of all football supporters in Italy. Our treatment variable is
Pi =1 if team i has been punished in 2006−07
Pi =0 if team i has not been punished in 2006−07.
To estimate the treatment effect we could simply compare the treated teams before and
after Calciopoli. However, this might pick up the effects of other factors that changed
during the posttreatment period. Therefore, we use a control group (teams unaffected by
Calciopoli) to ‘difference out’ these confounding factors and isolate the treatment effect.
We have four categories: (i) teams not punished before Calciopoli that will be punished
afterward, (ii) teams not punished before Calciopoli that will remain unpunished, (iii)
teams punished after Calciopoli, (iv) teams unpunished after Calciopoli. Since we are
using panel data, the teams in categories (i) and (iii) and categories (ii) and (iv) are the
same observed before and after Calciopoli.
Ifwetaketheaverageattendanceofateam i ineachcategory,Y i,andcomputethechangein
outcomeforthe ithteamtreated[Y ia − Y ib|Pi = 1]andthatfortheuntreated [Y ia − Y ib|Pi =
0]. A simple difference-in-differences estimator of the treatment effect is given by
2
A similar approach is used in Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) who study the causal effects of police on crime,
using the Buenos Aires terroristic attack in 1994.
3
Sondaggio Bordignon, Diamanti and Gardani (2010).
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Figure 1. Punished and unpunished teams – attendance trends
[Y ia −Y ib|Pi =1]− [Y ia −Y ib|Pi =0] (1)
where a and b denote ‘after’ and ‘before’Calciopoli.
The same result can be obtained in a regression framework, which uses the level of the
attendance in each round (t) as dependent variable
Yit =+1Pi +2Cis +3Xit +Pi ×Cis + it (2)
The DID estimator is the pooled OLS estimate of , the coefﬁcient of the interaction
between Pi and Cis. The regression-based estimator is more ﬂexible, allowing us to add
controls (i.e. vectorXit) and exploits the fact thewe have panel data. Our dependent variable
is log of attendance.
We estimate equation (2) together with equation (3), which includes team ﬁxed effects,
time dummies and ﬁrst-order autoregressive errors (an AR(1) error model).
Yit =i +t +1Pi +2Cis +3Xit +Pi ×Cis + it (3)
In general, the validity of the DID estimator relies on the assumption that the underlying
‘trends’in the outcomevariable (i.e. time effects t in equation 3) are common across treated
and untreated teams. To get some idea of the plausibility of this assumption we provide
some graphical evidence below (see Figure 1) and we perform a falsiﬁcation test (see
section V).
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IV. Data
Attendance data for Italian clubs were obtained from ‘StadiaPostcards’, which provides
since 2001 a complete report of all matches in Italian Football Serie A, B and Lega Pro
on a match-by-match, club-by-club basis.4 The sources of ‘StadiaPostcards’ are the main
Italian sports newspapers (La Gazzetta dello Sport, TuttoSport, Corriere dello Sport) but
also DataSport and the clubs’ ofﬁcial websites.
We have data from the season 2002–03 to 2010–11. We exclude the season 2006–07
for the reasons explained in the previous Section. This gives us four seasons of data before
Calciopoli and four seasons afterwards.
In our analysis, at match level, the initial panel includes 2,892 observations, where the
time dimension is the weekly round of Serie A during a given season, while the cross-
sectional dimension is the team. During the seasons 2002–03 and 2003–04 Serie A con-
tained 18 teams and we observe 306 matches per season. From 2004–05 the number of
teams increased to 20, and the matches played per season that we observe are 380.
The teams included in our treatment group are: Juventus, Milan, Fiorentina, Lazio and
Reggina. They all played in Serie A. Arezzo is the only team punished that was playing in
Serie B. We have excluded it, and consequently all of Serie B, because we did not have
enough observations to perform our estimation in both leagues.
In our control group we can only include teams that have played in Serie A for at least
one season before Calciopoli and at least one season after Calciopoli. This restriction is
necessary to be able to perform a DID estimation. Moreover, some matches were played
behind closed doors due to punishments imposed in response to outbreaks of hooliganism
and these matches are excluded from the data set.We therefore end up with a control group
formed by 15 teams, that did not play consistently in Serie A from 2002–03 to 2010–11.5
Thus, our ﬁnal sample is an unbalanced panel, and it includes 20 teams for a total of 2,292
matches played over eight seasons. For each team we observe from a minimum of 72
matches to a maximum of 167 (i.e. a team that has always played in SerieA from 2002–03
– e.g. AC Milan or Roma).
The teams in our sample represent more than 90% of the total supporters in attendance
at stadia. According to a survey6 the distribution of supporters among the ‘top’ teams in
Italy was unchanged for many years. Juventus has around 30% of match-day supporters,7
then Inter (19%) and Milan (16%). Following with percentages between 10 and 4.5 were
Napoli, Roma and Fiorentina, respectively. The same survey reports that two out of three
4
Information on Cagliari is not available on match-by-match basis and we only have aggregate season attendance
for this team.
5
This because some teams have been promoted to Serie A and other relegated to Serie B.
6
Bordignon et al. (2010).
7
Although Juventus has the greatest number of self-reported supporters in Italy, its matchday attendances are some
way behind those of the Milan clubs, AC Milan and Internazionale. Juventus has traditionally drawn large support
from all over Italy because it is the most successful team in Serie A. Juventus has won 27 scudetti. Since 1923, it has
always been controlled by the industrial Agnelli family (founder and owner of FIAT) and its support has traditionally
mainly comprised blue collar workers and Southern Italian immigrants to Turin, although local people from Turin
have tended to give greater support to the rival team, Torino. Thus, Juventus has generated lower attendances for
historical and cultural reasons. An additional reason for low crowds at Juventus home games was the uncomfortable
and somewhat ugly old stadium, Delle Alpi. In 2011/12, outside our sample period, Juventus moved to a new 41,000
capacity stadium which attracted sell-out crowds during the 2011/12 season.
© 2015 The Department of Economics, University of Oxford and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Consumer response to corruption 29
fans consider ‘Calciopoli scandal’either as a case of sport justice ‘affected by many errors’
or manifestly unfair because the investigation was limited to a few teams. Almost half of
the fans in the survey believed that the title of the season 2005–06 should not have been
assigned to anyone.
As we have already mentioned in section II, Juventus was relegated in Serie B for the
season 2006–07, as punishment for Calciopoli scandal. The team was weakened, because
some of its top players moved to other teams. Nevertheless, Juventus was promoted at the
earliest opportunity to Serie A in 2007–08, which is the ﬁrst season in our post-treatment
group. Knowing that Juventus always had the highest number and share of fans in Italy,
we decide to perform our estimations both including and excluding Juventus. This is a
robustness check to verify whether our results are mainly driven by the importance of this
team and its attraction for fans when it plays.
In Table 2 we report the teams included in both treatment and control group and the
average attendance for all the period 2002–03/2010–11. Figure 1 shows the pattern of
attendance at match level, for the treated teams and some controls. We can observe, for
example, that Inter, Roma, Udinese, teams that always played in Serie A during the period
of our analysis, have similar trends before and after Calciopoli . This could provide some
TABLE 2
Average attendance at match level
Seasons from 2002–03 to 2010–11
Team Average attendance No. matches
Punished
Fiorentina 30,109 132
Juventus 27,177 147
Lazio 33,614 167
Milan 56,368 167
Reggina 15,652 129
Unpunished
Atalanta 13,024 110
Bologna 21,002 110
Brescia 11,238 72
Chievo 12,077 147
Empoli 7,291 90
Inter 55,411 167
Lecce 13,523 93
Livorno 11,404 94
Palermo 26,222 133
Parma 15,263 148
Roma 43,321 163
Sampdoria 23,134 150
Siena 9,974 131
Torino 18,142 74
Udinese 16,524 167
Total 25,191 2,591
Note: Season 2006–07 excluded.
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evidence that our assumption of common trends across treated and untreated teams has
some plausibility.
In general, Serie A has registered a declining attendance trend from the 1990s. The
average attendance in the season 1991/92 was 34,205 per game which dropped to 29,883
in 1993–94 with the introduction of live pay-tv broadcasting. There is a continuous decline
down to 26,098 supporters in 2004–05.We shouldmention important changes in the Italian
legislation that have also affected attendance. In 2003 the ﬁrst Pisanu decree8 allowed the
police to arrest a supporter for up to 36 hours after the offence they are accused of, as if
they were caught in the act. In 2005, a second Pisanu decree9 introduced turnstiles and
match tickets bearing the user’s name. During the season 2005–06 the attendance dropped
to 22,476 fans per game. The lowest level of attendance, 19,711, was registered during the
season 2006–07, when the teams involved in Calciopoli scandal were punished. In 2007,
following some incidents that saw the death of a police ofﬁcer and later of a Lazio football
fan, a law imposed bans on fans travelling to away games, increased the punishment for
thosewho throwmissiles and extended the possibilities of expelling non-Italian nationals.10
The mean attendance in the season 2007–08 slowly increased to 23,887 and up to 25,570
in 2009–10.We take into account all those shocks that affected treated and untreated teams
in the same way by including in our models team and round ﬁxed effects.We are assuming
that the effects of hooliganism and poor stadia are the same before after Calciopoli and so
these effects do not affect the identiﬁcation of the treatment effect of Calciopoli.
Control variables
Our match-level models have several control variables which might represent confounding
effects in our difference-in-difference model. We include previous season performance,
measured here by previous season position, to control for between-season variation in
team performances. This captures habit persistence in attendance between seasons. We
expect that the higher the previous season’s average home attendance for the home team,
the greater will be match attendance this season (Forrest and Simmons, 2006).
We use previous season position rather than previous season points to permit inclusion
of promoted teams, which are given ranks of 21–24 underneath the Serie A ranks of 1–
20, where 1 denotes Champions. Promoted teams from Serie B might be predicted to
have poorer prospects of retaining Serie A status than incumbent clubs. To allow for this
possibility, we include a dummy variable for promoted clubs, promoted.
The home and away teams’ current performances, home and away points per game,
as measured by the ratio of points to games played prior to the match, are included to
control for current form of the opposing teams in a given match. In Serie A, three points
are awarded for a win, one for a draw and zero for a loss. As points per game cannot be
computed for the ﬁrst set of matches in each season, these matches are excluded from the
analysis. We predict positive coefﬁcients on home points per game and away points per
game. In the latter case, an away team with more points per game is likely to be more
8
Decree no. 28 of 24 February 2003.
9
Decree no. of 17 August 2005.
10
Law 41/2007 and Amato decree 1 November 2007.
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attractive to marginal home fans and will also bring more away fans to the stadium, ceteris
paribus.
To further capture other aspects of team performance and strength, the probability of
the home team winning, as derived from the bookmaker ﬁxed-odds betting market (home
win probability) is included.We also include home win probability squared to capture any
non-linearity in the attendance-home win probability relationship.
Betting odds on match outcomes were extracted from ﬁles in http://www.football-
data.co.uk and transformed into probabilities for each match outcome. The correlation
of odds between bookmakers is very high (around 0.95) and we opt for the odds sup-
plied by William Hill, as the source that gives us the greatest coverage of matches. The
sum of these probabilities will always exceed unity due to the bookmaker’s margin. This
margin, or ‘over-round’ is typically around 12%. We adjust the probability of each match
outcome by dividing by the sum of probabilities. The advantage of using betting odds is
that these should capture characteristics that are not easily observed such as player in-
juries, suspensions and dressing roommorale. If the betting market is efﬁcient then betting
odds should incorporate all relevant public and private information on the two teams in a
match.
There are two hypotheses giving different predictions as to the shape of non-linearity
of the attendance–win probability relationship. The ﬁrst, much discussed in the North
American sports economics literature (Humphreys and Watanabe, 2012) postulates that
fans want their teams to win but dislike excessively uneven contests. This is known as the
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis and proposes that match attendance will rise with home
win probability at a decreasing rate. Eventually, for high levels of home win probability,
match attendance may even fall. An alternative hypothesis is that the prospect of an easy
win will draw more fans to the game and so the match attendance–home win probability
relationship will be convex; attendances rise with home win probability at an increasing
rate.
Previous research from other European leagues has shown that the match attendance–
homewin probability relationship exhibits a U-shape as home team ex antewin probability
increases (see Forrest and Simmons, 2002, 2006; Buraimo and Simmons, 2008, 2009). In
European football betting markets, which are far more open and less restricted than North
American sports betting markets, we expect to ﬁnd that bookmaker betting odds, and
hence win probabilities, converge to market efﬁciency (Forrest, 2008). Hence, home win
probabilities taken from bookmaker odds are the best available estimates of likelihood of
a home team winning.
We lack speciﬁc information on ticket prices in Italian football, although these are
known to show small within-season intra-team variation relative to inter-team variation
through a given season. We therefore follow convention in the sports attendance demand
models by using team ﬁxed effects.
We also include derby, a dummy variable intended to capture matches of historical
rivalry between teams located closer to each other, in the same city or region. Previous
studies (e.g. Forrest and Simmons, 2002) have shown that such matches tend to attract
greater audiences, ceteris paribus, and the coefﬁcient on derby is therefore expected to be
positive and signiﬁcant.
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Our ﬁnal control variables are log of real regional income, log gdp, and regional popu-
lation, log population. We are agnostic on the predicted sign of coefﬁcient on the income
variable as attendance could be higher or lower if there is a greater share of low-income fans
in a city or province. Population captures potential market size and we predict a signiﬁcant
positive coefﬁcient on this variable.
V. Results
Table 3 reports raw difference-in-difference estimates of the effect ofCalciopoli on the ﬁve
punished (treated) teams in the sample, both at season level andmatch level.We ﬁnd a clear
reduction in attendances of punished clubs relative to unpunished clubs. This reduction,
attributable to Calciopoli, is of the order of 20% representing a substantial effect.
TABLE 3
DID – average attendance
Punished Unpunished diff N
Seasonal data
Attendance
post-Calciopoli 31,182 21,953 9,229 61
SD 14,054 13,567 3,849
pre-Calciopoli 37,719 22,687 15,032 63
SD 16,201 15,947 4,467
did −5803 124
SD 4,175
Log Attendance
post-Calciopoli 10.253 9.845 0.408 61
SD 0.451 0.535 0.144
pre-Calciopoli 10.442 9.834 0.608 63
SD 0.468 0.606 0.159
did −0.200 124
SD 0.152
Match-level data
Attendance
post-Calciopoli 31,208 21,967 9,241 1,157
SD 15,606 14,560 959
pre-Calciopoli 37,503 22,462 15,041 1,135
SD 17,439 16,441 1,098
did −5,800 2,292
SD 1,030
Log Attendance
post-Calciopoli 10.233 9.813 0.419 1,157
SD 0.484 0.597 0.036
pre-Calciopoli 10.414 9.792 0.622 1,135
SD 0.506 0.664 0.041
did −0.203 2,292
SD 0.039
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Our match level regression results,11 incorporating potentially confounding control
variables and including season ﬁxed effects are shown in Table 4. Model (1) reports OLS
results with robust standard errors, this corresponds to estimation of equation (2).12 Models
(2)–(6) correspond to the estimation of equation (3) and all employ an autoregressive error
term of order one to capture habit persistence in the dependent variable. Model (2) includes
home team ﬁxed effects, season dummies and a team time trend, whereas Models (3)–(6)
include round ﬁxed effects. We prefer the latter four models since these do not constrain
the time-effect coefﬁcients to lie on a straight line for each team. Model (4) and (6) are
both omitting Juventus as a special case since this team bore the brunt of the Calciopoli
punishment.
The use of match as unit of observation enables us to test for a potentially negative
externality on home teams. Gate attendances might be lower if a punished team is the
visitor. Some home fans may express disapproval of a punished away team by staying at
home while away fans may be more reluctant to travel. We assess this negative externality
by means of a t test on the coefﬁcient of the interaction term, Calciopoli times punished
away team,C × Paway inmodels (5) and (6), which otherwisematch the estimates inmodels
(3) and (4).
F-tests of joint signiﬁcance reject the null hypothesis of zero coefﬁcients in eachmodel.
Similarly, the ﬁxed effects models always deliver jointly signiﬁcant team coefﬁcients.
Round ﬁxed effects are also always jointly signiﬁcant at least at 5% conﬁdence level. A
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the ﬁxed effects are uncorrelated with the
regressors. We therefore retain the OLS estimates for comparison and focus on the ﬁxed
effects estimates in columns (2)–(6). Our most general and preferred model is (5), which
includes the away team Calciopoli interaction term and Juventus.
Our match-level control variables perform much as expected. Game attendances are
higher for matches of local rivalry (derby). Attendances are greater the higher is previous
season league position, the greater are home and away team points per game just prior to
the match, the lower is regional income (though imprecisely estimated) and the greater is
regional population as proxy for potential market size.
We ﬁnd that attendance falls with ex ante win probability for the home team as as-
sessed by ﬁxed odds bookmakers. But attendance falls at an increasing rate with home
win probability as shown by the signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient on home win probability
squared. The turning point for home win probability is 0.61 in model (5) (0.6 excluding
Juventus) and this is within sample.13 This estimated U-shaped relationship between home
win probability and attendance is consistent with match attendance results for England
and Spain (Buraimo and Simmons, 2008, 2009). Games in Italy’s Serie A appear to attract
larger numbers of fans where the home team has a very low probability of winning or a very
11
We have estimated seasonal level models, but due to the small sample size, evident from Table 3, we have
discarded this analysis. However, in the ﬁxed effect model the DiD effect attributable to Calciopoli is a statistically
signiﬁcant reduction in attendance of about 12%. We do not report these results, but they are available upon request.
12
We have also estimated equation (2) clustering the standard errors at team level. This methodology, which
excludes the use of ﬁxed effects, did not provide any signiﬁcant effect of Calciopoli. To take into account and
alleviate potential issues of serial correlation, as highlighted in Bertrand, Duﬂo and Mullainathan (2004), we have
estimated equation (3) and performed several robustness checks.
13
Turning points are 3.313/(2Å2.733) from column 5 and 3.348/(2Å2.772) from column 6.
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TABLE 4
Models for Serie A attendance – match level
Dep var: Log attendance
Mod.1 Mod.2 Mod.3 Mod.4 Mod.5 Mod.6
C × Phome −0.148*** −0.163*** −0.179*** −0.160*** −0.178*** −0.159***
(0.040) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.037)
C × Paway 0.013 0.015
(0.019) (0.020)
teamtrend 0.003***
(0.001)
promoted −0.482*** 0.023 −0.017 0.002 −0.014 0.005
(0.038) (0.031) (0.036) (0.041) (0.036) (0.041)
positionprevseas −0.045*** −0.005** −0.007*** −0.006** −0.007*** −0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
home points game 0.263*** 0.096*** 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.092*** 0.093***
(0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
away points game 0.256*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.060***
(0.023) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
home win prob −1.656*** −3.476*** −3.475*** −3.526*** −3.313*** −3.348***
(0.346) (0.156) (0.162) (0.172) (0.165) (0.174)
home win prob2 2.379*** 2.798*** 2.823*** 2.872*** 2.733*** 2.772***
(0.360) (0.163) (0.170) (0.183) (0.170) (0.183)
derby 0.139*** 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.151*** 0.143*** 0.150***
(0.053) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
log gdp 0.014 −0.634*** −0.382 −0.390 −0.410* −0.419*
(0.026) (0.168) (0.235) (0.239) (0.233) (0.237)
log pop 0.125*** 1.078*** 0.729*** 0.726*** 0.747*** 0.746***
(0.028) (0.060) (0.262) (0.267) (0.261) (0.265)
N 2,178 2,158 2,158 2,018 2,158 2,018
F 233.335 785.434 78.664 73.764 79.165 74.390
F 164.517 161.052 151.147 158.941 149.184
F 1.39 1.27 1.34 1.24
Notes: Std.err. in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
F: F test that all i = 0. F: F test that all t =0.
Chow test of structural break after 2006 Mod.1: Chow= 6.215>F(18; 2134)=1.608.
Model 1, OLS with robust SE.
Model 2, AR(1) with Home Team ﬁxed effects, team time trend and Season dummies
Model 3, AR(1) with Home Team ﬁxed effects, Round ﬁxed effects and Season dummies
Model 4 similar to 3 but excludes Juventus. Model 5 similar to 3 and include Away Team effect.
Model 6 similar to 5 but excludes Juventus.
high probability of winning. At low home win probabilities there is a ‘David and Goliath’
effect where fans turn up to games expecting their team to lose but hopeful that they can
witness a surprise result in overcoming an ex ante superior opponent. At high home win
probabilities fans turn up to games to enjoy the prospective thrill of winning, preferring
this to be by a large margin. At intermediate home win probabilities, the Goliath effect is
wearing off while the dominant home team strength effect has yet to be revealed.14
14
This result is inconsistent with – indeed diametrically opposed to – the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis
suggested for North American sports leagues. For these leagues it is sometimes argued that fans prepared to enjoy a
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Turning to our Calciopoli focus variables, we ﬁnd a substantial negative treatment
effect on home teams from Calciopoli – related punishments. A Chow test, reported at the
bottom of Table 4, conﬁrms the presence of a structural break in attendances after 2006.
Point estimates of reduction in match attendances are between 15% and 16%with Juventus
included and around 15% with Juventus excluded.15 This reinforces the descriptive results
shown inTable 3.As noted above, gate attendances might be lower if a punished team is the
visitor. The interaction term for Calciopoli and away team punished has an insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcient in the ﬁxed effects estimates, regardless of whether or not Juventus is included.
This suggests that the Calciopoli effects on attendance are attributable to fan responses to
home team misdemeanours and not away team punishments.
Interpretation and robustness checks
So far we have shown that attendances among the treated clubs, those teams which were
penalized as a consequence of the Calciopoli corruption scandal, fell signiﬁcantly com-
pared to the control group. The treatment group comprises ﬁve clubs that were exposed
to have been engaged in corrupt practices and received punishments. There are at least
two plausible interpretations of the results shown in Table 4. First, football fans do not
like corruption (they are morally upset) and they penalize the clubs that were punished
by staying away from games. Alternatively, fans perceive the effects of the punishment as
harming their teams’ prospects. The punishments might lead to star players leaving and
make it difﬁcult for convicted teams to recruit players. These effects both lead to reduction
in team quality. More generally, fans stay away from games because of disillusionment
with the team. Some fans may even take the view that all teams were corrupt to some
extent and ‘their’ team was just unlucky enough to be exposed. This latter interpretation is
certainly consistent with the notion of inherent corruption highlighted by Foot (2007) in
his account of numerous episodes of corruption in the Italian football dotted throughout
the 20th century.
The difﬁculty of disentangling consumer responses to corruption into distaste (viewing
corruption as unethical) and practical concerns over efﬁciency and competence of princi-
pals affects other studies of corruption. For example, Ferraz and Finan (2008) show how
Brazilian voters punished politicians by voting for opponents when these ofﬁcials were
revealed and publicized to be corrupt following audits disseminated in local media. Ferraz
and Finan use a similar difference-in-difference methodology to ours. In their case, it is not
clear whether voters disapproved of politicians’ unethical behaviour or whether they were
just concerned that corrupt politicians would be more likely to mismanage tax revenues.
As a partial attempt to separate the ‘moral disapproval’ and ‘disillusionment’ expla-
nations of reduced attendance for treated teams, we make use of the fact that Calciopoli
investigations were initiated within-season, i.e. during the 2005–06 season. These
higher ex ante winning probability for the home team but at a diminishing rate, thus implying an inverse U-shaped
relationship between game attendance and home win probability rather than the U-shaped relationship found for Italy
and other European football leagues. However, Coates, Humphreys and Zhou (2014) present evidence for a U-shaped
relationship between attendance and home win probability for Major League Baseball. They attribute this result to
’loss aversion’ by home fans around reference points based upon cumulative prospect theory.
15
We adopt the formula exp() − 1 to obtain the percentage impact of a dummy variable with coefﬁcient .
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investigations were not publicly revealed but a key date appears to be 12 February 2006. On
this day, Internazionale hosted Juventus and lost 1–2. Both teams were in contention for
the title. The referee was subsequently formally involved in the Calciopoli investigations.
He was criticized in the media for making several dubious decisions against Internazionale
including the award of a gratuitous free-kick that led to a Juventus goal. Following this
important game, rumours of the imminent scandal started to circulate. In the Calciopoli
proceedings it later transpired that the chief executive of Juventus had previously16 intim-
idated the referee by entering his dressing room and asking for particular favours to be
granted towards Juventus. We use the signiﬁcant date of 12 February 2006 to investigate
attendances before and after the key match using the same treated and control groups as
for our main analysis. Panel A in Table 5 reports estimates from just the 2005–06 season.
We ﬁnd that the effect of the interaction term for Calciopoli and home team punished on
attendances is large and signiﬁcantly positive; there is a 17% increase in attendance with
Juventus and 16% increase without Juventus. These results are inconsistent with the ﬁrst
‘moral disapproval’explanation (or announcement effects). Supporters continued to follow
their teams in the 2005–06 season even though rumours of a corruption investigation were
circulating in the media. In the second part of the 2005–06 season, from February to May,
fan support at stadia actually grew.
Next, to evaluate whether there is an immediate reaction of fans to the punishment of
their supported teams, we test for Calciopoli effects by focusing on the seasons directly
before and after the punishments were imposed. Our pretreatment period is then 2005–06
and our treatment period is 2006–07, the season of the punishment. Juventus was relegated
to Serie B for the 2006–07 and is thus excluded in these estimates, shown in Table 5,
Panel B. We also show estimates excluding Internazionale since this was the team that
won the Scudetto and beneﬁtted the most from the punishments of direct rivals including
Juventus. Table 5, Panel B reveals that the effect ofCalciopoli punishment is a reduction in
matchday attendance by about 7%. This effect is essentially unchanged when we exclude
Internazionale.
We test for persistence effects of Calciopoli by restricting the post-Calciopoli period
to one, two and three seasons respectively. This facilitates a test for time-varying effects of
Calciopoli on the treated teams. The pre-Calciopoli period is four seasons as before. The
estimates reported in Table 5, Panel C are for the ﬁxed effects model with autoregressive
errors, equivalent toModel 3 inTable 4. Restricting the data to one year after theCalciopoli
punishment, i.e. the 2007/08 season, we obtain difference-in-difference estimates of home
team attendance reductions of 20.5% with Juventus included and 11.6% with Juventus
excluded (coefﬁcients of −0.229 and −0.124 respectively).We ﬁnd evidence of persistent
effects of smaller magnitudes two years after Calciopoli punishment with coefﬁcients
of −0.152 and −0.108. For three years after Calciopoli, the same declining pattern in
attendance of treated clubs is conﬁrmed and gets slightly stronger. The coefﬁcients are
−0.176 and −0.144. The estimates in Table 5, Panel C suggest that in the initial post-
Calciopoli period, the publicity surrounding the malfeasance of ofﬁcials from Juventus
and four other clubs led to a stronger effect on attendances of Juventus than on the other
treated clubs. Over a longer post-Calciopoli period, the gap in attendance effects between
16
At the end of the match Reggina – Juventus played on 4 November 2004 and lost by Juventus for 2–1.
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TABLE 5
Models for Serie A attendance – match level
Panel A: moral disapproval Panel B: Calciopoli year effect
* **
C × Phome 0.189*** 0.176*** −0.076** −0.076**
(0.043) (0.046) (0.033) (0.033)
N 293 275 563 526
F 54.005 52.806 49.088 48.502
F 167.624 159.801 191.487 194.898
Panel C: persistence effect
1 year 1 year* 2 years 2 years* 3 years 3 years*
C × Phome −0.229*** −0.124** −0.152*** −0.108** −0.176*** −0.144***
(0.051) (0.057) (0.039) (0.043) (0.035) (0.040)
N 1,339 1,254 1,628 1,525 1,903 1,782
F 94.295 91.023 85.500 80.872 87.098 82.076
F 114.012 116.870 133.289 128.849 146.215 137.692
Notes: Std.err. in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. F: F test that all i = 0.
*Juventus and **Internazionale excluded from the sample, respectively.
Moral Disapproval: Home Team FE model – only 2005/06 before and after 12 February.
Calciopoli year effect: Home Team FE model – 2005/06 vs. 2006/07.
Persistence of the Effect: AR(1) with Home Team FE Models.
First year after Calciopoli is 2007/08. Before Calciopoli from 2002/03 to 2005/06.
Juventus and the other punished clubs narrows. This result is consistent with increasing
adverse effects on teams other than Juventus suggesting that fan disillusionment with the
smaller punished clubs actually increased.
We also re-estimate the ﬁxed effects model with autoregressive errors, equivalent to
Models (3) and (4) in Table 4 but with the addition of interactions between rounds (week-
ends in the season) and seasons.The difference-in-difference effect ofCalciopoli on treated
teams is −0.17 with Juventus and −0.13 without, only slightly lower than the main es-
timates in Table 4, suggesting robustness to these additional interactions. One possible
concern is that team quality may have worsened for treated teams through the departure of
star players and their replacement by more mediocre players. Inspection of team squad lists
provided by ESPN soccernet does not reveal any unusual transfer activity for players of
treated and non-treated teams over the 2005–06 and 2006–07 seasons, except for Juventus
which during the season 2006–07 played in Serie B and lost some top players. Moreover,
the average after-tax basic player salaries reported each year by Gazzetta dello Sport show
little variation over this period and actually grew slightly for the treated teams, by 5%,while
they were static for non-treated teams. Earlier, we suggested that fan disillusionment with
a treated team’s prospects might have been behind the loss of attendance post-Calciopoli
but it seems that if such disillusionment existed it was not directly related to player turnover
or changes in player quality, at least as proxied by player salaries.
We ﬁnally perform a falsiﬁcation test to check whether there are any other pre-existing
differences in trends. We are aware that the failure of the parallel trend assumption may
cause our difference-in-difference estimators to be biased. We therefore run the same
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regressions in equations 2 and 3, considering only the seasons before Calciopoli scandal
really happened:
Cis =0 if team i played in s =2002−03, 2003−04
Cis =1 if team i played in s =2004−05, 2005−06
We redeﬁne our treatment variable as follows:
Pi =1 if team i has been punished in 2004−05, 2005−06
Pi =0 if team i has not been punished in 2004−05, 2005−06.
In this waywe can test if the outcomes in the two comparison groups had a parallel trend
before the teams involved in Calciopoli scandal were punished. Signiﬁcant difference-in-
difference coefﬁcients would cast doubts on the adequacy of our comparison groups. The
falsiﬁcation tests reported in Table 6 show that most of the control variables behave in the
expected direction, except the coefﬁcient of the interaction between the ‘false’Calciopoli
and the punished team which is never signiﬁcant. This suggests that our results are robust.
Economic signiﬁcance
It is useful to assess the economic signiﬁcance of our results by means of a simple simu-
lation. FromTable 4, a 16.3% loss of attendance for treated teams means 6,115 fewer fans
for a treated team in the post-Calciopoli period, on average, compared to before.Assuming
an average ticket price of C28, the loss of attendance for treated (punished) teams converts
into a total loss to these teams of C3.25m per team in a given post-Calciopoli season. In
the whole post-Calciopoli sample period the revenue loss is computed at C65m across ﬁve
punished clubs and four seasons. This is clearly a non-trivial sum.
Of course, our calculation represents ex post costs only. To evaluate whether corruption
was actually beneﬁcial in net terms,wewould need to assesswhether the beneﬁts (revenues)
during the years before the Calciopoli punishments were outweighed by the losses after
the penalties were enforced.This assessment would need to consider gains in gate revenues
and prize money due to Juventus winning SerieA and competing in the UEFA Champions’
League before 2006. The ﬁnancial situation is different for AC Milan as the other ‘big’
club to be punished: they played in the Champions’League in 2006–07 and went on to win
the competition. AC Milan’s loss of gate attendance was only for domestic league and cup
games.
The simulated revenue loss is actually understated since it only considers the loss of
gate attendance attributable toCalciopoli punishment and excludes loss of other sources of
revenue such asmerchandise sales (replica shirts), loss of sponsorship income as businesses
may not wish to give their names to clubs tainted by corruption, and loss of sales of
broadcast rights as television companies will expect to pay less for a competition that
may be undermined by undetected corruption. Moreover, star players may wish to leave
punished clubs due to lower expected performances by these clubs and diminished career
prospects. However, although a few top players left Juventus in the 2006–07 season as they
did not wish to play in the inferior Serie B, in general we found that Calciopoli itself did
not produce any substantial impact on teams’ turnover of players.
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TABLE 6
Falsiﬁcation tests models for Serie A attendance – match level
Pre-Calciopoli assumed in 2002–03 and 2003–04
Post-Calciopoli assumed in 2004–05 and 2005–06
Mod.1 Mod.2 Mod.3 Mod.4 Mod.5
C × Phome −0.007 0.039 0.055 0.035 0.051
(0.160) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034)
C × Paway −0.041 −0.043
(0.028) (0.029)
promoted −0.369 0.047 0.068 0.048 0.070
(0.250) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
positionprevseas −0.057*** −0.018*** −0.016*** −0.018*** −0.016***
(0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
home points game 0.174** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.055***
(0.083) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
away points game 0.310*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.066***
(0.062) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
home win prob −0.774 −3.415*** −3.534*** −3.292*** −3.400***
(1.260) (0.254) (0.267) (0.260) (0.273)
home win prob2 1.719 2.799*** 2.956*** 2.717*** 2.864***
(1.378) (0.258) (0.277) (0.261) (0.281)
derby 0.168* 0.133*** 0.149*** 0.132*** 0.148***
(0.097) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
log gdp −0.047 −2.011** −2.208** −1.915** −2.110**
(0.156) (0.955) (0.955) (0.952) (0.952)
log pop 0.241 5.545*** 5.322*** 5.570*** 5.345***
(0.209) (0.983) (0.980) (0.980) (0.976)
N 1,065 1,065 997 1,065 997
F 51.107 16.539 15.859 16.349 15.717
F 236.647 201.379 235.750 200.677
Notes: Std.err. in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Fu: F test that all i = 0
Models 1 OLS with robust std. err.
Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 Home Team Fixed effects, Round and Season dummies.
Models 3 and 5 exclude Juventus. Models 4 and 5 include Away Team effect.
VI. Conclusion
TheCalciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005–06 season serves as an oppor-
tunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behaviour, following punishments
imposed by the Italian league on clubs whose ofﬁcials were found guilty of corrupt prac-
tices. Using a difference-in-difference estimation method, where the convicted teams are
the treatment group, we ﬁnd that home attendances for treatment teams fell relative to
control group teams deﬁned as those clubs not subject to league-imposed punishment. The
strong advantage of the difference-in-difference method applied here is the identiﬁcation
ofCalciopoli effects in a context of declining attendances affecting all Italian clubs and not
just the punished clubs. Both the raw difference-in-difference and the regression-adjusted
results support the conjecture of declining attendances for the ﬁve punished teams over
and above a trend decline in the Italian league as a whole.
© 2015 The Department of Economics, University of Oxford and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
40 Bulletin
Our use of match-level data facilitates a test of a potential adverse effect of punished
opposing teams on home teams’ attendances. The data do not support the presence of this
particular externality.
We show further that the fall in attendances identiﬁed with Calciopoli punishment
resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reductions. Our results suggest that a sizeable number
of fans of the punished clubswere subsequently deterred from supporting their teams inside
the stadium.Hence, our analysis of theCalciopoli episode shows that harmful effects follow
for clubs that are detected and punished for engagement in corrupt practices, over and above
the direct punishments meted out. Team sports competitions are vulnerable to a number of
sources of potential corruption, including explicit match-rigging.
Our results suggest that sports leagues can perhaps highlight the additional adverse
consequences of punishments as a deterrent for future corrupt practices by club ofﬁcials
who may be open to temptation. The analysis here also serves as a helpful methodology for
identifying the consequences of punishments for clubs found guilty of corrupt behaviour.
In addition to the punishments imposed on producers (clubs) it appears from our results
that consumers (fans) inﬂicted further punishments in later periods.
We should stress that our ﬁnding of a substantial negative effect of Calciopoli on
attendances of punished clubs is not necessarily due to moral disapproval by the home fans.
Indeed, the within-season analysis, reported in Table 5 and discussed above, points against
this explanation.A number of alternative explanations are possible. Fans of punished teams
may observe that the prospects for success of their clubs are reduced by the punishment,
which typically took the form of points deductions. These deductions could have led to a
process of downward momentum for the team as it slips down the league standings not just
in the punishment season but in later seasons too. Alternatively, fans of punished teams
might stay away in protest at the punishments inﬂicted by the League authorities. Either
way, the end result is the same. The punished club loses gate attendances and associated
revenues and is in a weaker position to compete effectively against rivals.
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